"Trade Wars and the 'War on Terrorism': Transatlantic Economic Relations after September 11 2001"

A spate of transatlantic trade disputes in the early- to mid-1990s, at first glance, appeared to lend credence to the contention that the common security threat of the Cold War had suppressed the politicisation of transatlantic economic competition. From this perspective, the elimination of the common enemy had removed the lid from a number of simmering trade tensions between the US and EU. If this contention were correct, we should expect that the new security challenge posed by global terrorism (highlighted by 9/11) would prompt an calming of transatlantic trade tensions. Using transatlantic trade disputes since September 11 2001 as a lens, this paper, however, argues that such behaviour is the exception rather than the rule. Although geostrategic considerations may influence decisions to initiate formal trade complaints, they do so only in exceptional circumstances. Many other political factors discourage governments from initiating formal trade disputes, particularly with respect to regulatory barriers to trade. This paper therefore problematises the decision to initiate a formal trade dispute and expands the range of political considerations that influence the decision to initiate a trade dispute -- intermediary steps towards developing an explanation for such decisions